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The Foreign Office
Replies to A.J.Sylvester
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Following this letter 16th of
September from Mr Sylvester, Mr Orde of the Foreign Office sought advice
from a Whitehall colleague, Mr Kitson:
"I have had several letters from Mr
Sylvester regarding this case. We can give Lloyd George, as a former
employer of Mr Gareth Jones, a great deal of information, which is of
legitimate interest in the case. The basis that there is a German-Japanese
conspiracy is far-fetched. I cannot help imagining that Mr Lloyd George is
trying to make political capital out of this. We could tell Mr Sylvester
that we are trying to get hold of Müller and take his story."
Mr Kitson wrote in reply:
"his story is very sensational, but there
is just some possibility that there is some truth in it. We might send copy
of the letter to Sir Alexander Cadogan and to the Berlin Chancery to
see if they have any information on Müller. "
In consequence of this note, the
Foreign Office sent copies of Sylvester’s letter to the British Embassies in
Peking and Berlin.
The British Embassy in China denied the
theory of a German-Japanese pact. “There is evidence that at least some
members of the Japanese staff are in contact with the Germans, but no
evidence to connect them.” On 18th September, Sir Alexander
Cadogan met Mr Hsu Mo (whom Gareth had interviewed in Nanking) at the Wai
Chia Pu and pressed for further information regarding the murder of Gareth
Jones, which His Majesty’s Ambassador said he would: “like to receive in
time for use in answering questions which would undoubtedly be asked in
Parliament.”
Mr Basil Newton of the Berlin
Embassy was asked for information on Müller and was assured that the Foreign
Office would not necessarily pass everything on for “internal political
reasons”. On 26th September he replied that:
"Unless General von Blomberg,
some officials at the War Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the
most arrant liars there is no treaty or entente between Japan and Germany
today. What is more, in view of Hitler’s peculiar views on racial questions
- which are no joke as any German Jew can testify - it will take a good deal
of persuading him to join with Japan or any other exotic race against the
chosen Aryan stock."
These Embassy replies suggest that the
Foreign Office was completely unaware of any negotiations and were not
trying to hide any suggestion of an impending agreement.
On September 23rd, A.W.G.
Randall of the Foreign Office stated that there was no foundation whatever
to substantiate a German-Japanese Pact. He noted that Messrs Jones and
Müller made the trip against the advice of the local and British authorities
and had signed a voluntary bond disclaiming the Chinese authorities of
responsibility.
On 5th November, Kitson produced
the following report:
This is the comprehensive report referred to in the Peking despatch. It
contains all the available evidence covering the case from the time of
Müller and Jones’ departure from Peking to Jones’ death and the
identification of his body. After recapitulating all the facts of the case
and assessing the evidence supplied by the enclosures to this despatch, Mr
Howe reaches the conclusion that while certain Japanese elements may have
been connected with the bandits and while the Japanese military authorities
may have been responsible for their original presence in the area in
question the Japanese authorities must be acquitted of direct connivance in
the affair and that the actual kidnapping was the work of the bandits
themselves.
In assessing this case we are largely dependent for the truth on the
evidence of the only available witness of the kidnapping, and Mr Jones’
companion, Dr Müller; and a perusal of his report, supported by the evidence
contained in certain of the other enclosures, bears out to a marked degree
the story contained in The Week. In his report, Dr Müller shows that
the road taken by himself and Jones from Dolonor to Kalgan was recommended
to them by the Japanese in Dolonor who had previously arrested them in the
belief that they were after military secrets. Later in the same report
Müller says that the bandits told him that he owed his release to the fact
that he was a German. This is corroborated by the statement of Mr Yang, the
chief representative of the Chahar Government in Kalgan, who expressed to
Lieutenant Millar the view that Müller was released because he was a German,
“and the relations of the Germans and the Japanese are friendly”. This
evidence lends colour to Mr Sylvester’s allegation regarding a
German-Japanese understanding. At the beginning of his report, Müller
states that two Japanese were attached to the band which held Jones, and
that these Japanese had proposed to despatch him, but the Chinese leader of
the band had refused. Later he quotes the bandits as having declared that
they had entered the Japanese service and had been commissioned by a
Japanese authority in Jehol to cross the Chahar border and create as much
trouble there as they could.
This despatch was written before Sir A. Cadogan had received copies of Mr
Sylvester’s letters but presumably the latter will not materially affect the
conclusion quoted in the first paragraph of this minute, which represents
the considered view of the Embassy after consideration of the very facts
(i.e. Müller’s evidence) on which Mr Sylvester’s allegations and The
Week’s report are apparently based. But I am afraid that if we were to
send Mr Sylvester the enclosures to this despatch it would be difficult to
get either him or Mr Lloyd George to agree with Peking’s conclusion, and Mr
Lloyd George would probably be provided with some useful ammunition for
awkward questions in the next Parliament.
I suggest that for the present we should take no action on this despatch,
but await Sir A. Cadogan’s considered views on the letters from Mr Sylvester
which have been forwarded to him, before making any communication to Mr
Sylvester on the matter.
The despatch also clears up one or two of the points raised in Mr
Sylvester’s original letter. For instance it informs us for the first time
of the presence on the trip of Baron von Plessen. It also throws light on
the question of Müller’s release and his subsequent failure to return.
Müller says that the bandits at first asked him to return after his
negotiations for the release; later, however, they waived their demand that
he should go back to them. He says that both Lieutenant Millar and Captain
Scott agreed with him that his liberation must necessarily be final (i.e.
that he need not return).
The following are hand written comments from the Foreign Office appraising
this document:I have now read this report and annexes, and agree that it is
premature to disclose any of it to Mr Lloyd George. The Embassy in Peking
has been asked for their opinion on the allegation of Japanese complicity
and on the suspicions regarding Dr Müller. Until they reply we must do
nothing and if Mr Sylvester asks we can tell him we are awaiting a complete
report from Peking, with particular points raised by him.
In the meantime it will be noted that the allegations of Japanese complicity
are mainly from a Chinese source (the report in Kalgan of the Chahar
Government); without confirmation these may well be open to doubt. Yet
there is sufficient evidence of the Japanese being mixed up in the case
(bandits once being in Japanese service, Japanese directions as to the
route) to cause Mr Howe to qualify to a certain extent his denial of direct
Japanese connivance.
I am afraid that the wording of this despatch would be hell to justify Mr
Sylvester’s worst (and no doubt, largely unwarrantable) suspicions. We must
therefore wait for a direct answer to our direct questions to Peking.
(SGD) A.W.G. Randall. Dated 8/11/1935
I agree with above appreciations and that we should wait for what is still
to come from Peking. We must be very careful meanwhile what we say to Mr
Sylvester and avoid if possible that there are ‘complete reports’ which we
might then be asked to publish.
Publication would serve no useful purpose and would only make trouble.
These are facts which justify suspicions but we should never be able to get
further than that Müller’s frankness as to the route having been recommended
by the Japanese rather tends against the theory that he was in league with
them.
(SGD) C.W. Orde. Dated 11/11/35
In the Foreign Affairs debates
of 1935 and 1936 in which Lloyd George spoke, there was no reference to
Gareth’s capture or murder. Questions were asked in Parliament in 1935
concerning the plight of British Nationals held for ransom in China during
the previous four years and the reply was that Gareth was the only known
victim of banditry despite a number of persons being made captive. A year
later there was further reference to Gareth in Parliament and it was
reported in Hansard that:
On
Monday, July 13th, 1936, Mr H. Day, M.P., asked the Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the names of British Subjects
kidnapped in the past year and held for ransom; of which have now been
released by their captors; what ransom was demanded; and what amount was
paid.
Viscount Cranborne replied
for the Government that:
During
the period from July 1st 1935, to the present time, there only
occurred one case in which a British subject was involved. Mr Gareth Jones
was captured by disbanded bandit soldiers in Eastern Chahar on July 27th,
1935. His captors originally demanded $100,000 and a supply of arms.
Negotiations for his release were rendered impossible by the subsequent
rapid movements of the bandits, who eventually killed their captive on
August 16th.
The Foreign Office acted in line with the
policy which later became known as ‘appeasement’. If, in so doing, their
aim was to thwart Lloyd George from discovering the truth about a possible
German-Japanese alliance, then they were clearly successful. However in so
doing they also prevented Sylvester and the Jones family from finding out
the truth about Gareth Jones’ murder.
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