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Soviet needs peace in critical winter

By WALTER DURANTY.Bv Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

New York Tunes (1857-Current file); Nov 22, 1932: ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 – 2) pg. 6.

 

SOVIET NEEDS PEACE IN CRITICAL WINTER

Bolsheviks Fear War or Revolt

in Europe Would Wreck

Russia’s Program.

BUT OUTBURST IS EXPECTED

 

The Kremlin Believes Frantic Foreign Nationalism Will Lead to a conflict.

By WALTER DURANTY.

 

By Wireless to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Nov. 21.—The Soviet Union confronts the Winter, which it fears will bring disaster to Europe, with little less anxiety than some of the capitalist countries that are trying desperately to cope with the effects of the economic crisis.

The fact that the U.S.S.R. has become a world State whose fortunes are interwoven with the rest of the world is only part of the picture, as the Kremlin sees it. The Kremlin leaders today know better than any one what misery the depression is inflicting upon the European masses.

This is especially true of Germany, whose agony the Kremlin sees unblurred by the patriotic discretion of the German press or the careless optimism of foreign correspondents anxious to make cheerful reading for the folks at home.

 

Sees War or Revolt.

 

In the Kremlin’s opinion the coming Winter is loaded with the deadly Issue of war and revolution, and the Bolsheviki lean to the view that fascism—frantic nationalism— will provoke war in an attempt to avert an Internal explosion of the masses, preferring a quick death to slow starvation. In either case the U.S.S.R. could hardly avoid entanglement. Once a storm bursts, who can set its limits?

According to the Soviet interpretation of historical events by economic cases, the Japanese Manchurian adventure was primarily due to the effects of the crisis upon the Japanese organic system. As a result of the Manchurian war cloud, the Soviet Union was forced to put an extra strain upon its transportation system and food supply, which immensely increased the difficulties contingent upon its ambitious program of industrialization and socialisation, known as the Five-Year Plan.

As matters now stand the U. S.S.R. finds itself extended to the limit of its national effort, and any additional tension could not fail to disorganize the program on which the government has staked so much at a cost of such sacrifice. This, therefore, is the critical period of the program, when its undoubted gains still seem in danger of being swamped by countless difficulties.

 

Holds Peace Is Vital.

 

If peace can be maintained the Soviet Government is confident the difficulties will be overcome and that a year or two will bring comparatively smooth sailing, but a disturbance now would be little short of disastrous. More than any country in the world the Soviet Union today finds peace desirable and almost necessary.

For this reason a grave revolutionary outbreak In Germany or elsewhere looms before the Soviet Government as a positive menace, because things being what they are the Soviet Union would be almost inevitably involved. Even if Russia managed to hold aloof, a grave disturbance in Europe, especially a revolutionary disturbance, would work havoc with the Five-Year Plan, which is the keynote and kernel of Soviet policy.

That this is the case will be shown in subsequent dispatches, but for the present let the fact remain that Moscow Is now watching Europe with a keen premonition of a disaster it feels almost powerless to avert. Far from trying to foment revolution, the U.S.S. R. today is ready and eager to cooperate in any sincere attempt to combat the effects of the depression and to restore the economic order.

*********

 

 

Russia Reported

A series of articles in the New York Times

Gollancz 1934.

by Walter Duranty

 

THE CRISIS IN THE SOCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE

 

Page 313

 

Moscow, November 24, 1932.—The Soviet programme of socialisation and industrialisation, known as the Five-Year Plan, has run against an unexpected obstacle— the great and growing food shortage in town and country alike. It is as if a huge machine, constructed with incredible effort, had begun to function, not perhaps with full efficiency, but far better than any save the most optimistic of its builders expected, only to confront the danger that the fuel supply that drove it suddenly had begun to fail.

Two-thirds of the Soviet population will be lucky if it gets more than bread, potatoes, and cabbage this winter as a regular diet, with fish three times a week, say, and meat perhaps once a week. And that in quantities below the people’s wants and probably below their needs. There is no famine or actual starvation, nor is there likely to be. And, for the most part, all will share alike in the various localities. But it is a gloomy picture, and as far as the writer can see, there is small sign or hope of improvement in the near future.

The end of the year brings to a conclusion the first Five-Year Plan and should mark the inception of a yet more grandiose project known as the second Five-Year Plan. In point of fact, both" plans "are a single continuous programme which, however successful, will be prolonged indefinitely, but which are subdivided into five-year periods for convenience and to provide a slogan for public understanding and stimulus.

On the face of things to-day, the first plan has done well.

 

 

 

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35 persons arrested for complicity and sabotage.

 

Moscow, March 12, 1933.—Over the signature of the Ogpu chief, M. Menzhinsky, an announcement was published to-day that 35 persons recently arrested for complicity and sabotage in a counter-revolutionary plot in connection with agrarian difficulties, many of them officials of the Agriculture and State Farm Commissariats and most of them former bourgeois or landlords, were sentenced to death yesterday, 22 others to ten years’ imprisonment, and i8 to eight years’.

The announcement adds laconically, "The sentences were carried into execution."

This is the most comprehensive act of its kind since 48 officials of the food distribution departments were summarily executed early in the autumn of 1930.

Among those shot the best known are M. E. Kovarsky, formerly of the tractor department; M. M. Wolff a member of the agricultural commissariat, who in i 931 prepared a "second Five-Year Plan" for agriculture; and a third high official, Feodor M. Konar, otherwise known as Polashchuk, a former vice-commissar of agriculture. Another was an agronomist who was a member of a former millionaire sugar family.

 

 

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The New York Times, Friday March 31st 1933.

RUSSIANS HUNGRY, BUT NOT STARVING

Deaths From Diseases Due to Malnutrition High, Yet the Soviet is Entrenched

This article by Walter Duranty was not included in his book Russsia Reported

These were included with one dated March 31st Berlin

 

 

********

 

BERLIN, March 31, 1933.—The recent executions of 35 high officials in various Soviet agricultural commissariats by the Ogpu involves a story of espionage that rivals the exploits of the famous Eugene Azev, who for many years lived a double life as a trusted leader of a desperate group of revolutionaries and as a spy for the Tsarist police.

The" hero "of the latest romance was Feodor M. Konar, lately vice-commissar for agriculture of the Soviet Union, who as such had access to the meetings and minutes of the Council of Commissars when his chief was absent on leave or business.

In 1920 Konar was expelled from the party on the ground that he was responsible for the failure of the Soviet government established in Polish Galicia during the Soviet-Polish War, but somehow he managed to explain matters and was reinstated. There was some confusion, he said, between him and another man named Polashchuk.

In the following year he went to Moscow to live with his brother. The latter also was a member of the Communist party and specialised in the affairs of the Communist International. Both were supple citizens who displayed particular ability in stepping exactly upon the centre of the " party line." That was an achievement in itself during the troublous years of the intra-party opposition.

Konar specialised in agriculture and steadily advanced in rank and importance, and two years ago he was appointed vice-commissar in charge of state grain collections. Meanwhile, his brother made frequent trips abroad on Communist International business, mainly to neighbouring states.

The apartment of the two men became the centre of the "true blue incorruptibles" of the Kremlin policy, and though most of their friends were men of secondary standing they were on excellent terms with the men of higher rank.

Suddenly, about a month ago, by sheer accident, according to the general belief it was discovered that Konar also was on "excellent terms" with a prominent foreign diplomat—too excellent terms—and an order went out for his arrest.

The story goes that he was indignant when the Ogpu guards summoned him. "It is absurd," he said of the order for his arrest. "I’ll telephone" (to the Ogpu headquarters) "at once." Then they showed him the signature on the warrant, and he buried his head in his hands.

Inquiry and Konar’s own confession brought out that for thirteen years he was a secret agent of a foreign power and that he was, in fact, responsible for the betrayal of the Galician Soviet because he was also Polashchuk.

He revealed, too, that his "brother" was not related to him by blood but was a brother agent in the same service, whose trips abroad served admirably to supplement the information Konar was unable to transmit directly to his diplomatic friends in Moscow.

Further investigation showed that there was a double conspiracy—not merely for the transmission of Soviet secrets to a foreign power, but to strike at the most vital point of the Soviet socialisation programme in diminishing the food supply and driving the peasants to ruin and hostility by deliberate mismanagement and sabotage of the grain collections.

The case was considered so grave that the whole presiding council of the Ogpu participated in the judgment. The evidence was utterly damning and for the first time in the Ogpu’s history the verdict was delivered without the court’s retiring for consultation.

And still another exception was made. The sentence was carried out immediately, instead of giving forty-eight hours’ grace for a possible pardon by the president of the republic.

 

 

 

 

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THE HARVEST

 

 

 

Page 354

KHARK0V, September 17, 18, 19, 1933.—I have just completed a 200-mile auto trip through the heart of the Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk of famine now is ridiculous.

Everywhere one goes and from everyone with whom one talks—from communists and officials to local peasants—it is the same story: "Now we will be all right, now we are assured for the winter, now we have more grain than can easily be harvested."

This "now" is significant. It contrasts with "then "—last winter—which, they tell you, "was hard." Hard it was and I saw empty houses that bore witness—people ran away to find work and food elsewhere.

On the other hand, there were no big fields of weeds such as I saw in the North Caucasus; here they sowed a greater area than last year and many—perhaps one might say most—of those who fled have returned to work on the harvest. The populace, from the babies to the old folks, looks healthy and well nourished. They are all awaiting the day when the state grain deliveries will be completed and they can sell on the open market the supplies of grain that they will have received for their work days.

Each individual will get about five to seven kilograms of grain per work day, nearly two tons on the average for the year, which is far beyond anything they had before, except in the rich kulak families. They expect the deliveries to be completed by the middle of October; then they can sell the grain and buy goods.

That is the first need of the peasants, to buy goods, but local communists and officials emphasise other needs— radio and telephone communication and, above all, better roads and signposts.

Twenty miles from Kharkov the signposts end and the road becomes a dirt track across the country. The peasants you ask know the nearest village and that is all, and you travel by map and by the sun and by guesswork.

One thing, however, is sure—the peasants have accepted collectivisation and are willingly obeying the Kremlin’s orders. The younger peasants already understand that the Kremlin’s way will benefit them in the long run, that machines and mass cultivation are superior to the old "strip system" and individual farming.

They get help from the tractor stations and have begun to understand that it is really help and not just orders from above but something that will improve their own living conditions.

Some of the older ones do not yet realise this and do not like the new way, but they are following it perforce. The children—Pioneers, they call them—are enthusiastic. One small boy told me, "I got a prize of a bicycle because my troop of Pioneers guarded the grain five nights from robbers. My mother said I was silly to go out like that and sleep in the fields, but she doesn’t understand that it is our duty to guard socialised property."

That is good Soviet doctrine that these children have learned.

"And how was it in the winter?" I asked the child. "Did many people leave your village?"

"Not many, but the lazy ones and those with kulak ideas," he replied. "They said collective farming would never work, that we were crazy to stay and try it. But we stayed and it does work. This year we have better crops than ever my grandfather, who is 8o years old, remembers."

And that is the answer—the Kremlin has got the younger generation on its side, and the combination of good weather, improved organisation, and new machines has produced results.

Nevertheless, one thing is clear—there has been a big change of personnel, not only among the upper ranks of the peasantry and the managers of the collective farms but in the Communist party officials. Both here and in the North Caucasus one finds lots of officials who have been on the job only six months or less.

One asks why. They reply rather vaguely, "The management here was not efficient," or "We were sent here," or "There were kulak elements and kulak sentiment in the managers of this or that section and they were removed and we came to replace them."

Then they add proudly:

"But we have done the job—this year we are months ahead of last year in grain deliveries."

I sum up my impressions from this trip and from conversations with scores of peasants and local officials—the collectivisation policy was not generally popular, there was much passive resistance last year, and those who resisted suffered bitterly. So to-day there is no more resistance and those who co-operate with the Kremlin policy have already begun to understand, and get, its benefits.

In short, the mechanisation and collectivisation of Russian agriculture have come to stay and the Kremlin has won its battle.

 

Page 356

September 18.—" Ukraine grain deliveries to the state had been accomplished 66 per cent by September 10—which was the same as the figure reached three months later last year—and we expect the full quota of 5,000,000 tone to be completed by mid-October," said the chief of the Ukrainian communist section of the tractor stations, Alexander Asatkin.

M. Asatkin, with whom I talked Saturday, declared the crop had surpassed the highest expectations as it had reached one ton per acre in some sections, where the collectivists were receiving 15 to 25 kilograms (33 to 55 pounds) per working day., but it is expected to run as high as seven kilograms per working day, which is two and a half times greater than last year.

The "socialised sector" of Ukrainian agriculture this year is 8o per cent of all the cultivated land and it is served by 646 tractor stations with an average of 40 machines each. About 70 per cent of the peasant population is collectivised, but in some sections, especially the southern wheat region, collectivisation has reached 85 and 90 per cent.

M. Asatkin said most positively that the Ukraine’s 33,000,000 population was amply assured of food for the coining year. Open-market prices are expected to drop 50 to 70 per cent when the state deliveries are concluded and the peasants are allowed to sell.

In reply to my question as to whether there had been mass emigration last year, M. Asatkin said, "There undoubtedly was a considerable outward flow from the villages and towns to the Donetz basin, to White Russia and elsewhere, but we, nevertheless, accomplished the sowing programme almost 100 per cent and with the summer months the population tide flowed back."

To another question as to whether the death rate was as high as 10 per cent, M. Asatkin said firmly, "No, nothing like it. There was certainly distress in some sections, but the reports were greatly exaggerated."

He admitted that there had been considerable mortality among livestock, which had increased the difficulty of the transportation problem, and he continued, "Despite the greatly augmented production of tractors and automobiles, transportation is one of our chief handicaps. The grain deliveries would have been completed already with better transportation. Delivery points and elevators are literally choked with grain."

That I can affirm from personal observation. M. Asatkin asserted confidently that the Ukraine accepted collectivisation once and for all and that the political section of the tractor stations had been a decisive factor in the struggle.

He, like his colleague with whom I talked at Rostov-on-Don, stressed the fact that the communist agents (politkas) of the tractor stations were less coercive than organisational in their functions.

"The peasants," he said, "now understand that we are really trying to help them improve their methods and lives. Our chief problem, after finishing the autumn sowing, will come during the winter months, in what we call ‘cultural work.’

"That includes everything from propaganda and educational meetings to improvement of radio and telephone transmission, the issuing of newspapers—-each political unit and tractor station has its own newspaper, published about ten times monthly—the bettering of roads, new building, and work among the women and youngsters, whom we consider no less important than the men."

M. Asatkin spoke with genuine enthusiasm, saying that his eight months’ work in the Ukraine had been extraordinarily interesting and had convinced him of the enormous possibilities of the tractor service in developing agriculture and raising the peasants’ living standards.

"Stalin was right," he concluded." We communists were to blame for not organising rural life and work and for thinking the collectives could run themselves on an efficient socialist basis without our control."

"Why didn’t you have political sections sooner?" I asked. "Because there were not enough tractors, for one thing," he replied. "But now we are producing them at a rate that will utterly transform the countryside in two or three years. Economically and culturally it will be the greatest revolution in the history of the world, and I am proud to have had the privilege of playing a responsible part in it."

 

 

Page 358

September 19.—Summing up the impressions of my ten days’ trip through the North Caucasus and the Ukraine, where I travelled with greater freedom and absence of supervision than had been expected, I repeat the opinion that the decisive engagement in the struggle for rural socialisation has been won by the Kremlin.

The cost in some places has been heavy, but a generally excellent crop is already mitigating conditions to a marked extent. But it still is clear that Soviet administrators must overcome more obstacles before the collective system and mechanisation of agriculture are completely mastered.

"Any Communist party member, local official, or political section commander who thinks the job is done because we had a good harvest and are well ahead with grain deliveries and autumn sowing is a social danger to-day; you might almost call him a traitor," said one of the editors of the Rostov newspaper Molot, and M. Asatkin echoed him.

"One of the things we now must fight the hardest is the spirit of satisfaction and resting on laurels," said the latter. "There is a vast amount of hard work ahead of us to create a collective edifice on proper cultural and technical lines."

Collectivisation may now be said to have been established on a solid foundation, with enormous benefit to the Russian countryside, on the condition that neither this year nor for several years to come will there be talk of extra requisitions or "voluntary super-deliveries" above the fixed programme. Authorities everywhere say there will not be extra demands and admit there were errors which are now corrected.

Because of what super-deliveries meant, successful collectives paid for the mistakes and mismanagement of others. By Soviet law and Communist party decree it is a criminal offence to-day to ask for extra deliveries. In the event of war or a similar great emergency it might be different, but short of such an emergency the extra delivery system is abolished.

 

 

Page 359

Moscow, December 16, I933.—For the first time in its history the Soviet Union has completed its state grain" collections "before the end of the year—specifically, by December 14, which is two and a half months earlier than ever before. Actually 96 per cent of the collections had been made November 1, and the Crimea performed the unprecedented feat of completing its deliveries by September 1. During August and September, deliveries, reckoned in ten-day periods, ran from three to five times higher than in the same period of last year.

The total of the collections is not stated in to-day’s news, but the writer was informed last September in Kharkov by the chief of the Ukrainian political section of the machine-tractor stations that it would be about 24,500,000 metric tons. As the needs of the urban population, construction camps, and army are abundantly met by 17,500,000 tons, there will be available 7,000,000 tons for reserve or export.

In the latter respect it is noteworthy that the proportion of wheat in this year’s collections is half as large again as that of last year.

This result fully justifies the optimism expressed to me by local authorities during my September trip through the Ukraine and North Caucasus—optimism that contrasted so strikingly with the famine stories then current in Berlin, Riga, Vienna, and other places, where elements hostile to the Soviet Union were making an eleventh-hour attempt to avert American recognition by picturing the Soviet Union as a land of ruin and despair.

Second, it is a triumph for Joseph Stalin’s bold solution a year ago of the collective farm management problem—a step that future historians cannot fail to regard as one of the major namely, the establishment of political sections in the tractor stations, political moves in the Soviet Union’s second decade. I understand that autumn sowing has slightly surpassed the programme, and the plentiful snow of this early winter augurs well for the future.

This year’s special preparation of tested seed for spring sowing, although slightly behind the programme, will undoubtedly be completed by the middle of February, and it can be stated confidently that the "socialised sector" of agriculture—the state and collective farms—which this year furnished 90 per cent of the grain deliveries to the state, will approach the spring sowing with a new spirit of courage and energy under the guidance of the political sections of the tractor stations.

It is significant that the peasant population that fled from grain-producing areas, which suffered last winter from a labour shortage, has flowed back to the villages. The peasant beggars who were a deplorable feature of life twelve months ago in Moscow, Kharkov, and Rostov-onDon, to name only three great cities, have now wholly disappeared.

It is difficult accurately to estimate what percentage of the total crop the grain collections form, as conditions vary in different regions. It probably is between 20 and 25 per cent, which would put the cereal crop at the record figure of 100,000,000 metric tons.

A further factor of great importance is that" free trade" in foodstuffs henceforth will be permitted for the entire country, which must not be considered a new "New Economic Policy" but is undoubtedly a big advance towards the goal, announced by M. Stalin, of" making every collective Bolshevik and every collectivist prosperous."

At the same time there is a serious obstacle to the development of this "free trade" by collectivised and individual farmers in the provinces which have completed their deliveries—namely, a shortage and poor distribution of manufactured goods and other urban products required by the villages. The Soviet Fulfilment Commission, of which Joseph Stalin is a member, recently announced considerable shortcomings in the dispatching of such essentials as salt and flour to rural districts.

The newspaper Economic Ljfe stresses similar weakness in the delivery of manufactured goods. Even in Moscow Province, for instance, only 6,ooo,ooo roubles’ worth of the 20,000,000 in goods supply assigned to the villages has yet reached the local rail station.

It is true that concentration during recent years on heavy industry and capital investment has led to a shortage of consumers’ goods, but their volume has been augmented of late, and their failure to reach the villages must be ascribed to other causes, chiefly poor transportation and distribution.

The transport problem remains to be solved, and freight-car loadings still run 20 to 30 per Cent below the daily schedule. In this respect there is a fruitful field for American enterprise—technical assistance and equipment.

As matters now stand there is a big gap in the Soviet Union between rural and urban producers. Money has little value to the peasant unless he can obtain goods with it, and unless he can do that there is no great stimulus for him to produce foodstuffs above his own needs.

 

 

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RUSSIA IS WATCHNG JAPANESE IN CHINA

But Will Take No Action to Halt Them Unless Soviet

Territory Is Involved.

TIME IS NOW VITAL FACTOR

By WALTER DURANTY

 

MOSCOW, Sept. 13.[1935]—While Europe’s attention is distracted by the war clouds darkening over Africa, the Japanese methodically continue their piano for "extension of Influence over China, The Russian are watching them impassively but with the keenest vigilance.

More than ten years ago the writer was told by a Soviet official who had spent considerable lute In the Par East:

"The Japanese are awaiting the opportunity which they believe the Versailles Treaty will give them. Japan is convinced that within twenty years from the signature of the treaty its imperfections and injustices will provoke a now period of crisis that doubtless will terminate in war. When that period begins Japan will feel free to ‘fulfil her national ‘destiny’ by invading China."

 

View Declared Prophetic.

 

These words were prophetic because it is no mere accident that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria coincided with the rise of Adolf Hitler. But it is Interesting—and important—to note that the Russians have been aware of the Japanese game from the outset.

To say that the Russians like what Japan is doing in China would be absurd, but between disliking something and taking measures to prevent it there is a great gulf. When it seemed two or three years ago that the Japanese plans might threaten Soviet territory also. Moscow's attitude was unmistakable. ‘Not one inch of Soviet land," said Stalin, and he backed his words by forming the Far Eastern army with its great warplane fleet. Today it can be stated positively that the Soviet Union has no fear of a Japanese attack, but that does not mean the Soviet Union is yet in a position to interfere with Japanese expansion in China. There are frontier incidents aplenty between Inner Mongolia. which is under .Japanese control, and Outer Mongolia, which belongs to the Soviet sphere. Moscow newspapers this week publish a dispatch from Britain hinting plainly that the murder of the British journalist, Gareth Jones, by "bandits" on the western fringe of Outer Mongolia was due to the fact that he knew too much about Japanese military preparations and troop concentrations in that region. It is thought here that Japan is on the verge of new action in Northern China, with the aim of consolidating the five Northern provinces, including Inner Mongolia, as a Japanese protectorate scarcely less disguised than Manchukuo itself. Faced by this probability Soviet policy is definitely "wait and see," because’ In point of fact the deeper the Japanese get their feet into Chinese mud the better the Russians are pleased.

 

Russians Need Time.

 

Of the cards that determine the issue in war and peace the Kremlin holds in its hand all except One— namely, time. The production of gold, food and machines, including chemicals, the Soviet baa now developed to a point where henceforth it will advance In geometrical progression. instead of the slow arithmetical progression of the earlier period. But still time is needed—two or three years—to let that geometrical progression have full play.

Thus one reaches this conclusive summary of Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese make hay in China, while the war clouds gather in Europe. The Russians watch them with no friendly eye, but will not raise a finger to check them unless they commit direct aggression against the Soviet Union.

 

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